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Dep’t of Taxation v. DaimlerChrysler Svcs. N. Am., LLC,  
121 Nev. Adv. Op. 56 (Sept. 15, 2005) (en banc)1 
 
COMMERCIAL LAW – DEBT RELIEF 
 
Summary 
 Department of Taxation (“the Department”) appealed from a district court order, 
which had granted DaimlerChrysler’s petition for judicial review of the Department’s 
decision denying DaimlerChrysler’s application for a tax refund under Nevada’s bad-debt 
collection statute. 
  
Disposition/Outcome 
 The Court reversed the order of the district court and held that DaimlerChrysler 
was not entitled to bad-debt relief under the statute because the statute “unambiguously 
precludes a finance company from obtaining tax refunds . . . .”2 
  
Facts and Procedural History 
 The facts and procedural history of the case are set out, succinctly, in the opinion 
as follows: 
Respondent, DaimlerChrysler Services North America, LLC, financed numerous 
retail motor vehicle purchases within the State of Nevada.  Under these 
arrangements, the purchasers agreed to repay all or part of the purchase price, 
including a pro rata portion of sales tax incurred, on an installment or credit 
basis.  As part of these sales, the dealers assigned to DaimlerChrysler all of the 
dealers’ rights associated with the contracts without recourse.  In exchange for the 
assignments, DaimlerChrysler paid the dealers the full amount financed under the 
contracts, including the full amount of sales tax.  From this amount, the dealers 
remitted the sales tax to the Nevada Department of Taxation (Department).  The 
contracts at issue eventually went into default and, after exhausting collection and 
repossession efforts, DaimlerChrysler determined that the unpaid balances were 
uncollectible.  It ultimately claimed the unpaid amounts as bad-debt deductions on 
its federal income tax returns for the years 1997 through 1999. 
DaimlerChrysler applied to the Department under NRS 372.365(5) for a sales tax 
refund proportionate to the unpaid amounts.  The Department denied the refund 
request, and an administrative hearing officer later denied a petition for 
redetermination.  DaimlerChrysler then appealed to the Nevada Tax Commission 
(Commission), which unanimously upheld the hearing officer’s decision.  
Subsequently, the district court granted DaimlerChrysler’s petition for judicial 
review, concluding that DaimlerChrysler was entitled to a sales tax refund.  The 
Department appeal[ed].3 
 
                                                 
1 By Danielle Oakley. 
2 Dep’t of Taxation v. DaimlerChrysler Svcs. N. Am., LLC, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 56 at 2 (Sept. 15, 2005) (en 
banc). 
3 Id. at 2-3. 
 
Discussion 
NRS § 372.365(5) provides,  
If a retailer:  
(a) Is unable to collect all or part of the sales price of a sale, the amount of 
which was included in the gross receipts reported for a previous reporting 
period; and  
(b) Has taken a deduction on his federal tax return pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 
166(a) for the amount which he is unable to collect,  
he is entitled to receive a credit for the amount of sales tax paid on account 
of that uncollected sales price.4 
 
 NRS § 372.055 defines retailers as “[e]very seller who makes any retail sale or 
sales of tangible personal property,” and “[e]very person making more than two retail 
sales of tangible personal property during any 12-month period.”5  Furthermore, NRS § 
372.040 defines “persons” as, among others, individuals, firms, or assignees.6  However, 
Chapter 372 also contains an anti-assignment statute, which provides: 
A judgment may not be rendered in favor of the plaintiff in any action brought 
against the Department to recover any amount paid when the action is brought by 
or in the name of an assignee of the person paying the amount or by any person 
other than the person who paid the amount.7 
 
 DaimlerChrysler asserted that, as the retailer’s assignee, it was entitled to the tax 
refunds available under the bad-debt statute.  The court disagreed for several reasons. 
 
I. Tax Exemptions Must Be Construed Strictly Against the Party Claiming the 
Exemption. 
 
DaimlerChrysler urged the Court to follow the Washington Supreme Court’s 
decision in Puget Sound Nat’l Bank v. Dep’t of Revenue,8 in which the Court addressed a 
similar statutory scheme.  That Court held that the assignee was entitled to the tax credit 
because, as here, “assignee” fell within the statute’s definition of “person.”9    
 The Court, however, chose to follow several other State Supreme Courts, which 
have held that finance company assignees are not entitled to tax exemptions under similar 
statutes.10   Those courts found that assignees were not entitled to tax credits because 
                                                 
4 NEV. REV. STAT § 372.365(5) (2004). 
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 372.055(1)(A), (C) (2004). 
6 NEV. REV. STAT § 372.040 (2004). 
7 NEV. REV. STAT. § 372.700 (2004). 
8 868 P.2d 127, 129 (Wash. 1994). 
9 Id. at 132. 
10 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler v. Weiss, No. 04-284, 2004 WL 2904685 (Ark. Dec. 16, 2004); Weiss v. Am. 
Honda, No. 04-617, 2004 WL 2904680 (Ark. Dec. 16, 2004); Chrysler Fin. Co., L.L.C. v. Wilkins, 812 
N.E.2d 948 (Ohio 2004); In re Appeal of Ford Motor Credit Co., 69 P.3d 612 (Kan. 2003); 
DaimlerChrysler v. State Tax Assessor, 817 A.2d 862 (Me. 2003); Dep’t of Revenue v. Bank of Am., 752 
So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Gen. Motors Acceptance v. Jackson, 542 S.E.2d 538 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2000); Suntrust Bank, Nashville v. Johnson, 46 S.W.3d 216 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). 
grants of tax exemptions must be “construed strictly against the party claiming the 
exemption.”11  Applying the rule of strict construction, the Court held that the plain 
language of NRS § 372.365(5) mandated the same outcome.  
 Additionally, the Court found the structure of the Act persuasive.  The definitions 
on which DaimlerChrysler relied appear in the beginning of the Act and are not 
specifically tailored to the bad-debt provisions that appear later in the Act.  Furthermore, 
the Court concluded it would not permit the “bootstrapping of several broad definitions to 
unreasonably distort the uncontested facts of a case or defeat a clear statutory 
directive.”12 
 
II. DaimlerChrysler Never Paid the Tax. 
 
The Court also found that DaimlerChrysler, a finance company, is not entitled to a 
tax credit because the finance company is not the entity responsible for paying the tax.  
The Court held that Nevada’s anti-assignment statute provides relief only for those 
parties who originally paid the tax.  Also persuasive to the Court was the use of the term 
tax “credit,” as opposed to a tax “refund.”  A credit can only be given to parties who have 
existing sales tax liability.  As third-party lenders, such as DaimlerChrysler, never 
develop tax liability to the Department, the use of the term “credit” suggests that the 
statute does not apply to finance companies.   
 
III. Legislative History of the Act Buttresses the Court’s Finding. 
 
 After reaching its conclusion for the reasons stated above, the Court supported its 
determination with a brief discussion of the legislative history of NRS § 372.365(5).  
Specifically, during discussions about the statute before the Assembly Committee of 
Taxation, the Executive Director of the Retailers Association of Nevada stated that “the 
retailer would file for a refund if the debt [was] not collectible.”13  The Court concluded 
that the legislative history of the statute supported the Department’s position that the tax 
credits exist solely for the benefit of retailers, not finance companies.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Because NRS § 372.365(5) did not afford DaimlerChrysler, as a finance 
company, bad-debt relief, the Court reversed the order of the district court, which had 
granted DaimlerChrysler’s petition for judicial review.  
  
Dissenting Opinions 
 
                                                 
11 DaimlerChrysler Svcs. N. Am., LLC, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 56 at 6 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Svcs. v. CIR, 
875 A.2d 28, 30-36 (Conn. 2005)). 
12 Id. at 10. 
13 Id. at 11-12 (quoting Hearing on A.B. 535 Before the Assembly Taxation Comm., 69th Leg. (Nev., June 
12, 1997). 
 Justice Maupin and Justice Hardesty each filed dissenting opinions.  Both justices 
found that DaimlerChrysler meets the statutory definition of retailer and that 
DaimlerChrysler was the entity that had actually paid the tax. 
